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Introduction
all medical treatments have potential harms as well as benefits, 
and it is vital that everyone has a good understanding of what 
these might be, how dramatic they might be and how likely. in 
fact, in the uK, the Montgomery judgement in the supreme court 
in 2015 (see Box 1) has made it a legal necessity for patients to be 
given comprehensible, personally relevant information about all 
reasonable treatment options, including none.1 so, how should we 
ensure good, clear communication of relevant evidence?
This article therefore reviews what is known about how doctors 
can best communicate evidence so that patients can make 
informed decisions based on them, as the Montgomery Judgement 
demands. At first glance, it might seem that this should be a 
relatively simple question to answer, but there are a couple of big 
underlying problems.
Understanding the problem
One problem is what do we mean by ‘good understanding’ of a 
risk or benefit? clearly, we do not just mean someone can recall 
a number—the percentage chance of something happening. 
Knowledge of a fact is not the same as understanding. We want 
a patient to imagine the range of things that might happen to 
them and to understand how likely each is compared with other 
things that they are familiar with; to slot these new scenarios into 
their personal framework of ‘what might happen in my life’ in an 
appropriate way, allowing them to weigh up evidence and to make a 
decision that is right for them. What an ‘appropriate’ way to imagine 
them is, will depend very much on their individual experiences 
and perception. That personalised, internalised concept of risk or 
chance is, then, very hard to define, let alone measure.
a patient’s concept of the numbers involved is also only a part 
of what feeds into their final decision. Their emotions and personal 
values will all have a huge influence on their risk perception and 
decision-making, so we cannot assess their understanding of the 
facts by what decision they make either.2 3 some of these (such as 
their feelings about a particular outcome) are entirely appropriate 
factors to weigh in their decision. Others (such as their feelings 
towards their doctor) we may wish to minimise. There are so many 
things that can affect a patient’s understanding, especially when 
we are considering a personal interaction, that minimising these 
unwanted biases is very hard.
This complexity means that it is not easy to create simple 
guidance on how to communicate evidence clearly to patients.
However, there are some useful findings from research that are 
worth every healthcare professional knowing.
Target information to the decision in hand
research has shown how important it can be to cut to the chase when 
giving people information. For instance, studies of an online tool to 
help with the choice of adjuvant therapies after breast cancer surgery 
found that the standard format—bar graphs giving the potential 
outcomes of a range of four different options—was more easily 
understood if it was simplified, giving only the outcomes for the two 
options the patient was weighing up at that time.4 5 it is important, 
then, to understand what the patient in front of you—or your patient 
population in general—really cares about and wants to know more 
about before launching into giving information.
The question of ‘how much information is too much’ is obviously 
tricky to answer in the abstract, but if you are giving information in 
person, you can tailor it, assessing how much an individual patient 
Box 1. The Montgomery judgement
in 1999, nadine Montgomery was preparing for the birth 
of her son sam. she was of small stature, with diabetes, 
and was concerned about being able to give birth naturally. 
Unfortunately, difficulties did arise during birth, and Sam 
suffered brain damage as a result. Her obstetrician had not 
discussed the risk of this particular complication occurring, 
deeming it best nadine attempted a vaginal birth. On appeal at 
the supreme court, nadine Montgomery won her case. This laid 
down a new legal basis for informed consent, in line with the 
general Medical council guidelines;1
“The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable 
care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material 
risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any 
reasonable alternative or variant treatments.”
“The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances 
of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient's 
position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, 
or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the 
particular patient would be likely to attach significance to 
it.”
“The assessment of whether a risk is material cannot be 
reduced to percentages. The significance of a given risk is 
likely to reflect a variety of factors besides its magnitude”
“The doctor’s advisory role involves dialogue, the aim 
of which is to ensure that the patient understands the 
seriousness of her condition, and the anticipated benefits 
and risks of the proposed treatment and any reasonable 
alternatives, so that she is then in a position to make an 
informed decision.”
“This role will only be performed effectively if the 
information provided is comprehensible. The doctor’s duty 
is not therefore fulfilled by bombarding the patient with 
technical information which she cannot reasonably be 
expected to grasp, let alone by routinely demanding her 
signature on a consent form.”1
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Box 2. Teachback and clear communication
 ► ‘Teachback’ is a method of checking that you’ve explained 
something clearly. You can ask patients and carers to tell you 
what they’ve understood, or ask them to show you if you’ve 
given them instructions on how to do something. nhs 
scotland’s health literacy place website has training on how 
to do this effectively (http://www.healthliteracyplace.org.
uk/tools-and-techniques/techniques/teach-back/).
 ► The centers for Disease control in the usa have put 
together plain language materials and resources 
(https://www.cdc.gov/healthliteracy/developmaterials/
plainlanguage.html).
Box 3. Ways to communicate risks
There are many different ways to convey a risk, and the terms 
can get very confusing (especially as the symbol % can be used 
for both percentages and percentage points).
Here is a quick guide:
 ► Absolute risks are simply the chances of an event 
happening, the same as its incidence or ‘actual risk’ (eg, a 
10%, or 10 in 100, chance of having a stroke).
 ► Absolute Risk Reduction (ARR) or Absolute Risk Increase 
(ARI) is the difference—in percentage points—between the 
control group and the treatment group.
For example, if 2 out of 100 people (2%) taking a drug 
experience stroke, compared with 10 out of 100 people (10%) 
taking a placebo, the ARR is 8% (percentage points) or 8 in 100 
people helped by the drug (10%–2%=8%).
 ► The Number Needed to Treat (NNT) is the number of patients 
you need to treat to prevent one additional bad outcome.
For example, if a drug has a nnT of 13 over 1 year, it means you 
have to treat 13 people with the drug for 1 year to prevent one 
additional bad outcome.
The nnT is also the inverse of the arr. so if the arr is 8%, 
the NNT is 1/0.08=12.5 (round to 13). Without explanation 
and careful wording, these are also difficult for patients to 
understand.32
 ► Relative risks are comparisons between two risks. They 
tell you nothing about the absolute chance of an event 
happening.
 ► Risk Ratios (RRs) are a common form of relative risk: the ratio 
of one risk to another.
For example, if 2% of people taking a drug experience stroke, 
compared with 10% of people taking a placebo, the rr is 0.2 
(2/10); (a risk ratio of 1 would mean the drug had no effect, a RR 
<1 would mean it reduced stroke incidence, rr>1 would mean 
it had increased it). These are commonly reported in scientific 
papers but would likely be meaningless to a patient.
 ► The Relative Risk Reduction (RRR) or Relative Risk Increase 
(RRI) is the percentage change in events between the treated 
group event rate compared with the control group event 
rate.
For example, if 10% of people taking a placebo experience 
stroke, but only 2% of people taking the drug experience stroke, 
the RRR is 80% ((10%–2%)/10%=80%).
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has taken in. Breaking up the conversation into chunks and at the 
end of each, using the ‘teach back’ method—asking patients to 
state back in their own words what they have understood—will 
help them process it and help you get the right level (see Box 2).
Use familiar everyday words and be careful of 
particularly emotive ones
since we know that our emotions influence our decision-making, 
it is vital to be very careful not to arouse them unwittingly or 
too much. For instance, emotive terms like ‘mad cow disease’ 
can evoke fear that overwhelms any probabilistic information 
alongside it.6 however, unfamiliar terms also appear more 
frightening and are deemed more risky. This also applies to 
words that are just difficult to pronounce (such as the fictional 
food additive hnegripitrom compared with the equally fictional 
magnalroxate)—they also seem to be judged riskier!7 it may also 
be that labelling symptoms as a ‘disease’ or a ‘syndrome’ may 
make people more likely to over-ride information about evidence 
of (in)effectiveness of treatment options too.8 9 consult the plain 
resources in Box 2 and test out words with a suitably non-medical 
audience, such as patient representatives or a focus group, to 
find out which they find confusing or frightening (eg, the term 
‘side effects’ is often preferred to ‘adverse effects’ by patients).
Don’t rely on words, give numbers alongside them
Words mean different things to different people. Tests of what 
patients understand by the european Medicines agency’s 
recommended terms to convey the probabilities of adverse effects 
consistently show that they are misinterpreted by both healthcare 
professionals and patients.10–12 For instance, when non-medically 
trained people were told an adverse effect was ‘common’, they 
tended to think that it will happen around 50% of the time. Doctors 
surveyed in one study put the probability of ‘common’ at around 
25%. in fact, in official communications and patient information 
leaflets, this term is used for adverse effects that occur 1%–10% of 
the time. crucially, these differences in people’s perceptions of the 
risk also influenced their opinions on whether they would take the 
medication or not.
Never give just relative risks (and be careful with just 
absolute risks)
Medicine changes our risks: lowering some and raising others. 
But knowing just how much it has changed is not enough 
information to make a decision. The classic example is the famous 
contraceptive pill scare of 1995, which followed publication of 
official advice that newer contraceptive pills were associated with 
twice the risk of venous thromboembolism compared with older 
products. not surprisingly, women reacted by stopping taking the 
contraceptive pill, and statistics show an excess of about  
12 400 additional births and about 13 600 additional abortions in 
the following year.13
The twofold increase referred to by the public statements around 
the contraceptive pill is a relative risk increase (see Box 3). What 
was the absolute risk that had increased twofold? about 1 in 7000 
per year for women on the ‘second-generation’ oral contraceptive 
pill. Those on the ‘third-generation’ pill, about which the warning 
was made, had a doubled risk, then, of about 2 in 7000. For women 
who become pregnant, ironically, the absolute risk of venous 
thromboembolism is about 4 in 7000 per year.14
Relative risks, then, can exaggerate the perception of difference, 
and this is especially prominent when the absolute risks are very 
small. They should never be used alone.
conversely, absolute risks can also be misleading on their own, 
without context to tell whether that risk is relatively high or low (eg, 
‘the risk of you developing breast cancer at some point in your life 
is about 14%’ can only be interpreted when given more information 
about population averages). Giving absolute numbers such as 
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Box 4. Simple frequencies and expected or natural 
frequencies
There is confusing terminology around two different kinds of 
frequency.
a simple frequency is just the chance of something 
happening expressed as one number out of another (such as ‘12 
out of 100’). It can be used as another way of putting across a 
simple percentage.
a natural frequency or expected frequency is more 
complicated. it is another way of expressing what you might 
remember from school as a ‘conditional probability’.
The classic example of when natural frequencies are useful 
is a scenario of someone getting a positive test result for a rare 
disease.
Example for a disease with prevalence of 1%
The test has an accuracy of 90% for people who have the 
disease (sensitivity) but has a false-positive rate of 9% 
(specificity=91%) for people who do not have the disease.
Your patient has a positive test: what are the chances they 
have the disease?
The conditional probability is the probability of having 
the disease, given that they have a positive result, and is 
complicated to calculate.
using natural or expected frequencies, however, would mean 
expressing all the parts of the question as simple frequencies, 
but starting with 1000 (or a similarly large number) and then 
breaking the frequencies down as you follow the logic of the 
scenario.
Calculation
Of the 10 who have the disease, the test will accurately diagnose 
9 (90% of 10), giving 9 correct positive tests.
Of the 990 who do not have the disease, the test will 
mistakenly diagnose 89 (9% of 990), giving 89 more (false) 
positive tests.
Your patient is 1 of the 98 total positive tests (9 correct plus 
89 incorrect). What are the chances that they have the disease 
(ie, are in the group of nine correct positive tests)?
so the natural or expected frequency approach allows you 
to see that the correct answer is 9 out of 98 (which is 9.2%). So, 
although it sounds counterintuitive, this essentially means that 
out of every 10 patients getting positive results on the test, only 
1 will likely actually have the disease; 9 will be false positives. 
clearly, this is an important fact for a healthcare professional to 
be able to calculate and communicate.33
natural frequencies are much easier to understand than 
conditional probabilities.
But simple frequencies are not always easier to understand 
than simple percentages.
Review
ARRsBox 3 is good in principle but, like everything, has to be looked 
at on a case-by-case basis. When absolute risks are very low, the 
numbers involved can be difficult for people to comprehend. In fact, 
a very small number (such as the chance that a test result could be 
wrong) is often ‘rounded down’ in our brains to zero over time.15 if it 
is important for people to realise that although the absolute risk is 
very low, the change is very significant and warrants their attention, 
then it might be appropriate to use the relative risk or increase as 
well. We all need context to understand numbers, and relative risks 
can help do that.
Give risks in the form of both frequencies and 
percentages, unless you are asking people to compare 
multiple risks
To give numeric evidence, you need to choose the format to give 
those numbers in. generally, the choice is between a percentage 
(eg, 20%) or a frequency (eg, 20 in 100). It is not clear which helps 
people the most, but what is clear is that everyone—regardless 
of education level—can easily get confused between them (eg, 
mistaking 20% for 1 in 20).
It is also worth being aware that people respond differently to 
the same number expressed as a percentage and as a frequency. 
in one study, professional forensic psychiatrists were asked to read 
biographies of violent patients and to assess their risk of harming 
someone in the 6 months after release. They were asked to record 
that risk both as ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’ and also to put a number on 
that risk, either as a frequency or as a percentage. it turned out that 
the psychiatrists assessed ‘20 out of 100’ to be higher risk than ‘20%’ 
(both when writing their own assessments and when reading others’). 
This is possibly because the act of thinking about ‘20 out of 100 
patients like this are likely to cause harm to others on release’ opens 
the imagination to those 20 vividly violent patients and makes the risk 
much more clear and present.16
given these issues, stating numbers as both a percentage and a 
frequency is probably safest to try to give people a balanced view if 
you are trying to help people understand a single number; but if you 
are asking people to compare risks, stick to just one or the other. 
The evidence is not strong, but comparing percentages seems to be 
easier than comparing frequencies.17 18 The only time there is strong 
evidence to prefer a frequency is in the case illustrated in Box 4, where 
you have ‘conditional probabilities’ and should instead use their 
frequency equivalent: ‘natural’ or ‘expected’ frequencies.
If you are giving several frequencies, make them all ‘out 
of x’ rather than using ‘1 in…’
Frequencies are expressed as one number ‘out of’ another number: 
they are essentially a fraction, and comparing two fractions involves 
some maths if they each have a different number on the bottom 
(the denominator). For instance, which death rate is higher: 1286 
out of 10 000 or 24.14 out of 100? You have to do some mental 
arithmetic (even though in this case it is simply shifting the decimal 
point). One study found that people tended to rate the first death 
rate (which translates as 12.86%) higher than the second (which is 
24.14%) when given the two wildly different denominators (‘out of 
10 000’ vs ‘out of 100’).19
A survey that asked the simple question: ‘Which of the following 
numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 1 in 100, 
1 in 1000, or 1 in 10?’ to a large panel of people in germany and in 
the usa found that 25% of the americans and 28% of the germans 
got the answer wrong.20
The explanation for these is based around the theory that people 
tend to ignore or be confused by the denominator and fixate 
more on the first number, the numerator. If the first number is big, 
something is seen as likely.21
Take care with your framing: talking about 
‘effectiveness’ versus ‘failure rate’
One of the most widely recognised ways to influence people’s 
impression of a number is framing it positively or negatively. 
Whether or not people perceive something as giving them a 
possible improvement on their current situation, or a possible 
detriment to it, fires their emotions in different ways, influencing 
their decision-making.22 One of the classic examples is a study 
that gave people the choice of two cancer treatments, one that 
gave survival rates after 1 and 5 years, and one that gave the 
same statistics in terms of mortality. The study was performed on 
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Figure 1 Two forms of icon array: (A) a traditional rectangular 
array showing multiple potential outcomes for 100 people 
(from the Predict:breast cancer risk communication tool34) 
and (B) icon arrays doubling as bar charts, aiding an easy 
comparison between different potential treatments (from the 
Predict:prostate cancer risk communication tool35). Original 
colours have been modified for DTB.
Figure 2 An example of a risk ladder, in this case designed to help communicate anaesthetic risks.36
Review
clinicians, students and patients, and all showed the same effect: 
the framing switched their preferences.23
There have been relatively few studies on ways to avoid the 
problems of framing, and none have given a convincing, real-world 
solution.24 At the moment, the best advice is: for important health 
decisions, frame the information in both ways if possible (eg, both 
effectiveness and failure rate), and if you are talking to a patient 
in person then get them to talk through their reasoning for their 
decision when they first think they have made it.25
Always use a graphic where you can
a picture is worth a thousand words as they say, and a good 
graphic can summarise and clarify a lot of numbers. if you have any 
opportunity to use one, do.
Bar charts and icon arrays have been shown to be fairly intuitive 
and help people understand numbers,18 as well as overcome some 
of the biases caused by the emotional aspects of medical decision-
making (figure 1).26
icon arrays can double as bar charts, if they are visually laid out 
to aid the comparison of the areas in two adjacent arrays, and have 
an advantage over a traditional bar chart in showing those who 
are unaffected as well as those who are affected. There has been 
some research on whether dots, faces or people icons are best, but 
it is not a simple answer.27 Some people find the anthropomorphic 
icons more emotional, and knowing how much emotions can affect 
decision-making, dots or blocks are probably safer. (For make-
your-own icon arrays, go to  iconarray. com.)
another type of graphic worth considering is a risk ladder (see 
figure 2). This puts risks along a number line, showing an order 
of likelihood. These have been used to help people understand 
a range of potential risks of a treatment option.28 however, how 
to help people understand the numbers on the scale (often 
logarithmic), or to choose any comparator risk that is shown on the 
scale to add context, is no simple task.26
Be upfront and as precise as you can be about your 
uncertainties
no amount of evidence can give certainty about what might 
happen to an individual patient. all we can talk about is what 
appears to have happened to similar patients in the past if they took 
one treatment option or another. it is important to help patients 
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Box 5. Free online resources to give people the 
evidence they need to decide on medical treatment
Condition-specific decision aids
These are best used in a face-to-face consultation to help clarify 
the evidence and a patient’s values.
 ► Ottawa hospital research institute a to Z inventory of 
decision aids (http://decisionaid.ohri.ca/AZinvent.php).
 ► NHS patient decision aids (https://www.nice.org.uk/
about/what-we-do/our-programmes/nice-guidance/nice-
guidelines/shared-decision-making).
 ► Patient info decision aids (https://patient.info/doctor/
decision-aids).
 ► Mayo Clinic decision aids (https://shareddecisions.
mayoclinic.org).
Decision boxes or fact boxes
These are designed to be at-a-glance summaries of the 
evidence, ideal for printed materials:
 ► Harding Center for Risk Literacy fact boxes (https://www.
harding-center.mpg.de/en/fact-boxes).
 ► University of Laval decision box (https://www.decisionbox.
ulaval.ca/en/).
Review
understand that, and giving numbers as a range rather than as a 
precise-sounding point estimate could help. Our own experiments 
suggest that people understand the uncertainty around a number 
and do not lose trust in the provider of the statistics if it is given 
as a numerical range (rather than as a verbal qualifier, such as 
‘estimated’ or ‘about’) (van der Bles et al, in prep).
For printed information: consider using fact boxes
Finally, for those who provide printed information about the 
evidence around treatment options, all of the above information 
has been combined to produce a standard, tested format known 
as a drugs fact box (see Box 5).29 These are in the form of a table 
summarising the potential benefits and harms clearly. Work is still 
ongoing to add graphics to them and refine them, but they are 
increasingly being adopted and there are guides available on how 
to make them.30
For those who are communicating evidence face-to-face, there 
is a free elearning course now available on the elearning for 
healthcare platform or at  moodle. wintoncentre. uk.
Conclusion
in summary, there is no right way to communicate evidence; although 
there are a few ways that are definitely wrong: those that confuse 
or push people in one direction or another. if you are preparing 
information for distribution, then test it with your intended audiences 
to see what they understand from it,31 and if you are talking to 
patients in person, keep asking them what they have understood 
so far. Moreover, remember: decisions are based on far more than 
just factual information. if a patient makes a decision that seems 
to contradict the evidence, it does not mean they have necessarily 
misunderstood; they could be making the right decision for them, all 
things considered.
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